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We consider a family of quantum communication protocols
involving N partners. We demonstrate the existence of a
link between the security of these protocols against individual
attacks by the eavesdropper, and the violation of some Bell’s
inequalities, generalizing the link that was noticed some years
ago for two-partners quantum cryptography. The arguments
are independent of the local hidden variable debate.
Historically, entanglement was essentially a source of
controversy on the foundations of quantum mechanics,
as illustrated by the lively debate about the local hidden
variable program and Bell’s inequality [1]. Today, it is
widely recognized that entanglement is a resource from
which tasks can be achieved that are classically impossi-
ble, as illustrated by many quantum information proto-
cols [2]. Among these protocols, quantum cryptography
— better described as quantum key distribution (QKD)
— is the one that has almost reached the level of appli-
cation [3]. In this work, we study the link between the
security of quantum communication protocols and the vi-
olation of Bell’s inequalities. Previous works [4,5] pointed
out such a link in QKD between two partners Alice and
Bob. We begin by reviewing these results, that will help
to clarify the initial intuition and the motivation for the
present work.
Consider the following QKD setup [6]. Alice prepares
an EPR state, say |Φ+z 〉 = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉), where we
write |0〉 and |1〉 for the eigenstates of σz. She keeps one
qubit and sends the other one to Bob. Alice and Bob
measure either σx or σy , then publicly communicate the
choice of the measurement basis. Whenever they have
used the same basis, their results are perfectly correlated,
and they can establish a key. This protocol is equivalent
to the BB84 protocol [7]. Its distinguishing feature is
the fact that the bits are encoded into orthogonal states
belonging to two conjugated bases.
To study the security of the protocol, consider an
eavesdropper (Eve) that acts on the quantum channel
linking Alice to Bob, trying to get some information but
inevitably introducing perturbations. To establish a key
in spite of these perturbations, A and B can run a one-
way protocol called error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation if and only if [8]
I(A : B) > min [I(A : E), I(B : E)] (1)
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where I(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(AB), H the Shan-
non entropy, is called mutual information. In the follow-
ing, we shall consider (1) as the condition for security,
although it is known that a secret key can be established
under less restrictive conditions by using two-way com-
munication [9].
In our context, Eve’s best attack is defined as the at-
tack that maximizes I(A : E) for a fixed I(A : B). The
best attack is not known in all generality [10]; but it
is, if we suppose that Eve performs an individual attack,
that is, that she makes only measurements on individual
qubits [5]. Moreover, it is also known that Eve can per-
form the best individual attack by using a single qubit
as resource [11], by implementing the following unitary
transformation affecting her and Bob’s qubits:
UBE|00〉 = |00〉
UBE|10〉 = cosφ|10〉 + sinφ|01〉 . (2)
Here, |00〉 etc. are shorthand for |0〉B ⊗ |0〉E etc. (by
convention, we supposed that Eve prepares her qubits in
the state |0〉), and φ ∈ [0, pi
2
] characterizes the strength
of Eve’s attack. Thus, after eavesdropping the system
of three qubits is in the state |ΨABE〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A ⊗
UBE |00〉+ |1〉A⊗UBE |10〉). Note that the roles of B and
E are symmetric under the exchange of φ with pi
2
− φ.
The mutual information between any two partners can
be calculated explicitly [12]: condition (1) for security is
fulfilled if and only if φ < pi
4
.
As we said above, there is a remarkable link between
the security of the BB84 protocol against individual at-
tacks and the violation of Bell’s inequalities. For any set
of four unit vectors a = {~a1,~a ′1,~a2,~a ′2}, let’s define the
two-qubit Bell operator
B2(a) =
(
σa1 + σa′1
)⊗ σa2 +
(
σa1 − σa′1
)⊗ σa′
2
(3)
with σa = ~a · ~σ. The CHSH inequality [13] reads
S2 = maxa Tr(ρB2(a)) ≤ 2, while the maximal value
allowed by QM is S2 = 2
√
2 [14]. The CHSH inequality
is optimal, in the sense it is violated if and only if the
statistics of the results cannot be accounted for by local
hidden variables (lhv) [15]. The Horodecki criterion [16]
allows an explicit calculation of S for each two-qubit state
obtained from |ΨABE〉 by tracing out the third qubit. We
find that the pair B-E never violates the inequality, while
SAB = 2
√
2 cosφ , SAE = 2
√
2 sinφ . (4)
Then obviously SAB > 2 if and only if SAE < 2: the
inequality is violated by the pair A-B if and only if it
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is not violated by the pair A-E. In conclusion, for the
QKD protocol that we consider, (1) holds if and only if
SAB > 2 > SAE (fig. 1).
FIG. 1. The link between violation of Bell’s inequality and
the security condition (1), in the case of the two-partners
QKD with best individual attack by Eve.
The previous paragraphs summarize the present
knowledge about the link between security and Bell’s in-
equalities. In the following, we shall generalize this link
for QKD protocols involving an arbitrary number of part-
ners. But before turning to this, let’s address the follow-
ing purely algebraic problem, which is naturally related
to this discussion. Consider three partners A,B and C
(here there is no more reason to single out an Eve), each
possessing a qubit. Are there pure or mixed states of the
three qubit system such that more than one pair can vi-
olate the CHSH inequality? The answer to this question
is negative:
Theorem 1: Let ρ be a three-qubit state, and ρAB, ρBC
and ρAC be the two-qubit states obtained from ρ by trac-
ing out one of the qubits. If one can find four unit vectors
~a,~a ′,~b,~b ′ such that Tr(B2 ρAB) > 2, then for all choice
of four unit vectors Tr(B2 ρBC) < 2 and Tr(B2 ρAC) < 2.
We present a proof inspired by Cirel’son’s proof that the
maximal violation of CHSH allowed by quantum mechan-
ics is 2
√
2 [14]. Let’s define the operator
V = BAB(~a,~a
′,~b,~b ′) + BAC( ~A, ~A
′,~c,~c ′) . (5)
where BAB = B2 ⊗ 1C , and similarly for BAC . Using
σaσa′ = (~a · ~a ′)1 + iσa∧a′ , lengthy but standard algebra
leads to
(
V 2
4
− 21
)2
= f1 , where f is a function of the
unit vectors that satisfies 0 ≤ f ≤ 4 [17]. This entails
|〈V 〉ρ| ≤ 4, that is max |〈BAB +BAC〉ρ| ≤ 4, where the
maximum is taken over the eight unit vectors that de-
fine V . But due to the symmetry BAB(~a,~a
′,−~b,−~b ′) =
−BAB(~a,~a ′,~b,~b ′), it holds that max |〈BAB + BAC〉ρ| =
max |〈BAB〉ρ|+ max |〈BAC〉ρ| = SAB + SAC . In conclu-
sion, SAB + SAC ≤ 4 for all ρ and for all choice of unit
vectors. This proves the theorem.
Two remarks: (i) It is easy to imagine experimental
protocols in which, for suitable states, both pairs A-B
and A-C end up with a violation of the inequality: e.g.,
a pair can analyze their data conditioning on the results
of the third partner, if they know this result through
classical communication; or, a pair may apply a filtering
procedure [18]. (ii) There are states depending on one or
more parameters such that one can ”shift” the violation
from one pair to another by varying the parameters: the
state introduced above in the context of QKD, in partic-
ular, is such that SAB(φ) > 2 if and only if SAC(φ) < 2
[19].
We explore now the generalization of the link between
Bell’s inequalities and security to QKD protocols involv-
ing more than two partners. The protocols that we
consider are characterized by the fact that the sender
distributes the key between several partners, in such a
way that all partners must collaborate to retrieve the
key. We call these protocols N-partners quantum se-
cret sharing (N-QSS) [20]. For simplicity, we discuss
in detail the protocol 3-QSS involving three partners,
and discuss later how this generalizes to an arbitrary
number of partners. Without eavesdropping, 3-QSS
works as follows. Alice prepares the 3-qubit GHZ state
1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉); she keeps one qubit and sends the
others to her two partners Bob and Charlie. The three
of them measure σx or σy; the GHZ state is such that
〈σx ⊗ σx ⊗ σx〉 = −〈σx ⊗ σy ⊗ σy〉 = −〈σy ⊗ σx ⊗ σy〉 =
−〈σy ⊗ σy ⊗ σx〉 = 1, and the other expectation values
vanish. Then A, B and C publicly announce the bases
they used, and keep only those measurements when all
measured σx, or when one measured σx and the oth-
ers σy. It is easy to see that each partner alone has
no information on the key of any other partner, but if
two partners collaborate then they have all the informa-
tion about the key of the third partner. Therefore the
meaningful information measure is the information that
B and C together have on A’s sequence of bits, that is
I(A : BC) = H(A)−H(A|BC) = 1−H(A|BC). In the
absence of eavesdropping, H(A|BC) = 0.
Two eavesdropping scenarios can be imagined:
Scenario 1: An external Eve tries to eavesdrop on both
channels A-B and A-C. We still restrict to attacks that
are ”individual” in the sense that each pair of qubits is
attacked independently from all the other pairs; but we
allow coherent measurements on the two qubits of each
pair.
Scenario 2: Charlie is dishonest: he would like to retrieve
the key alone, against the will of Alice who would force
him and Bob to collaborate. Then C collaborates with
Eve, who tries to eavesdrop on the line A-B in order to
get as much as possible information about Bob’s qubit.
The security issue on these protocols is analogous to
the two partners case. We sketch the argument, see [12]
for all details. The key of the demonstration is the fact
that the time ordering of the measurements is not im-
portant: if (say) the time of Alice’s measurement would
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change something in the local statistics of her partners or
in their correlations, the protocol would allow signaling.
Therefore, we can discuss security on completely equiv-
alent protocols in which some partners measure their
qubits first, this measurement acting as a preparation
on the state of the other qubits.
Take Scenario 1 first: When Alice measures her qubit,
she prepares one of the four states 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
1√
2
(|00〉±i|11〉). Therefore, one can see this protocol as a
two-partners communication, Alice sending information
to Bob-Charlie. Since we want to maximize I(A : E)
for a fixed I(A : BC), Eve’s best individual attack can
be copied directly from (2), replacing |0〉B and |1〉B by
|00〉BC and |11〉BC respectively:
UBCE|000〉 = |000〉
UBCE|110〉 = cosφ|110〉 + sinφ|001〉 . (6)
In particular, Eve can still perform the best individual at-
tack by using a single qubit. This is surprisingly simple,
because a priori Eve needs an increasing number of qubits
(22n) to perform the most general attack on n qubits.
However, even if Eve does not need a larger probe, she
must be able to implement a coherent operation on a big-
ger number of qubits. Under this respect, eavesdropping
on several channels is more complicated than on a single
channel.
Scenario 2 can be discussed in the same way: When A
and C measure their qubit, we have a single qubit flying
to B, encoded as in the BB84 protocol, and on which
E eavesdrops. We just have to be careful because the
direct analogy with the two-partners case gives us the
optimum of I(A : E) for a given value of I(AC : B),
not of I(A : BC). However, by the very definition of
the protocol, B and C are not correlated, whence I(AC :
B) = I(A : BC). Therefore, in Scenario 2 Eve’s best
individual attack on Bob’s qubit is (2).
The same arguments can be worked out for the pro-
tocol N-QSS involving N partners. The general eaves-
dropping scenario is shown in fig. 2: n < N − 1 partners
(Charlies, C) are dishonest, and want to retrieve the key
without the help of the N − 1 − n ≡ h other partners
(Bobs, B). Then again Eve can perform the best indi-
vidual attack using a single qubit, which must interact
coherently with all the h qubits that are to be spied. The
state of the N + 1 qubits after eavesdropping is
|ΨNh〉 = 1√
2
(|0N−h〉|0h〉|0〉+ cosφ|1N−h〉|1h〉|0〉
+sinφ|1N−h〉|0h〉|1〉) (7)
where the first ket are A and the dishonest C, the second
ket are the honest B that are spied, the third ket is Eve.
Let Ia = I(A : BC) the information between the autho-
rized partners, Iu = I(A : CE) the information between
the unauthorized partners. In analogy with the case of
two partners QKD, it can be shown that Ia > Iu if and
only if φ < pi
4
[12]. Now we can tackle the link with Bell’s
inequalities.
FIG. 2. The general eavesdropping scenario on N-QSS,
with h honest Bobs and n = N − h − 1 dishonest Charlies
collaborating with Eve.
For our study, we consider the family of inequali-
ties known as Mermin-Klyshko (MK) inequalities [21,22].
This choice will be discussed below. The Bell operator
for M qubits is defined recursively as
BM =
σaM + σa′
M
2
⊗BM−1 +
σaM − σa′
M
2
⊗B′M−1 (8)
where B′n is obtained from Bn by exchanging all the ~ak
and ~a ′k. The maximal value allowed by QM is SM =
2
M+1
2 , achieved for M -qubit GHZ states. An important
property of these inequalities is the following: the bound
SM ≤ 2m+12 , with m < M , can be violated only by states
in which more than m qubits are entangled [22,23]. We
shall say that a M -qubit state violates the inequality if
for this state SM > 2
M
2 , that is, if the violation can be
accounted for only by having M -qubit entanglement.
Having settled these notions, we can prove
Theorem 2: The state |ΨNh〉 given in (7) is such that
the authorized partners violate the N -qubit MK inequali-
tiy (in the sense just described) if and only if φ < pi
4
; and
in this range, the unauthorized partners do not violate the
(N − h+ 1)-qubit MK inequality. At φ = pi
4
, both sets of
partners are exactly at the border of the violation; and for
φ > pi
4
the roles of the authorized and the unauthorized
partners is reversed.
The proof (see [12] for all details) is a direct optimiza-
tion of expressions like 〈ΨNh|BN (a)⊗ 1 |ΨNh〉 over all
sets of 2N unit vectors a. This optimization is not easy.
We could perform it analytically when N and h have dif-
ferent parities (in particular, this is the case if h = N−1,
that is when all partners are honest and Eve is external);
and some cases where N and h have the same parity were
checked on the computer. Therefore, to within the lim-
itations of this proof, we can safely say that: for the N-
QSS protocols, and whatever the eavesdropping scenario
in which Eve uses the best individual attack, the security
condition Ia > Iu is satisfied if and only if the authorized
partners violate the MK inequality, and in this case the
unauthorized partners do not violate the MK inequality.
We recall that ”violation” here does not merely mean
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SM > 2, the limit imposed by lhv, but SM > 2
M
2 , i.e.
that all the qubits are really strongly entangled.
One might ask if a purely algebraic result like Theorem
1 holds for the violation of any M -qubit MK inequality.
The answer is negative. As a counterexample, the four-
qubit state cosα(|0011〉+ |1100〉+ i|0101〉+ i|1010〉)/2+
sinα(i|1001〉 + |1111〉)/√2 gives SABC = SBCD = 3 >
2
√
2 for α ≈ 0.955. However, we have numerical evidence
that no such states can be produced by Eve. Our current
knowledge on this question can be found in [12]. In any
case, the fact that a general algebraic theorem does not
hold in all cases strengthens the link between security and
violation of a MK inequality: even though in the Hilbert
space we can find states that violate two inequalities for
some shared qubits, these states do not appear in the
individual eavesdropping on a N-QSS protocol.
This leads us naturally to the question of the choice
of the optimal Bell’s inequalities. Our choice of the MK
inequalities is natural in the following sense: we are con-
sidering QKD protocols in which each partner measures
two conjugated observables; therefore, we choose also in-
equalities with two measurements per qubit. Werner and
Wolf have recently classified all the inequalities of this
class, and have demonstrated that the MK inequalities
are those that give the highest violation, for GHZ states
[24]. It is not impossible that other inequalities may be
better suited for the study of security in other protocols
with more than two settings per qubit. For instance,
in the six-state QKD between two partners it is known
that SAB > 2 > SAE is a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for security [3,25].
Of course, we share the open questions of the whole
field of quantum cryptography: which is Eve’s best attack
in all generality? Or, does something change if the part-
ners share higher dimensional systems instead of qubits?
Note also that no satisfactory Bell’s inequality has been
found yet for higher dimensional systems. Under these
respects, the study of the link between Bell’s inequalities
and security seems to be a promising field of research,
at the border between quantum information and founda-
tions of quantum mechanics.
We conclude by stressing that Bell’s inequalities ap-
pear here in a context that is disconnected (at least at
first sight) from the studies on lhv: we have only dis-
cussed entanglement — to be precise, an entanglement
that is ”useful” for some quantum communication pro-
tocols. In other words, Bell’s inequalities seem to have a
role to play in ”present-day” quantum information pro-
cessing, and not only in the ”old” debate on lhv.
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